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Abstract 
This document analizes the case of the Agricultural Development Bank 
(ADB) of Trinidad and Tobago. It argues that development banks 
thrive best when the targeted sector is expanding and sector demand is 
increasing. The continued operation of a specialist development bank 
such as the ADB requires strong political and institutional support to 
the sector to accompany it, if it is to be successful.  There is also 
evidence that the marketing approach is essential for the success of 
development banks, as in the case of ADB where the bank found it 
necessary to reinvent itself, continuously thriving for innovations and 
continuously consulting the market for feedback in order to develop 
products to satisfy customer needs. 
The study suggests that ADB can significantly improve its viability 
through non-lending methods of disbursing funds, since loans increased 
its expenses and did not contribute to its profitability given the 
maintenance of repressed interest rates. In addition, economies of scale 
mattered to the efficiency of the institution, suggesting that the bank 
needed to strive after asset expansion by writing more business. 
Finally, the study contends that risk management techniques, 
inclusive of the quantification of risks, are essential to improving the 
viability of development banks such as ADB.  These banks need to 
embark on non-traditional ideas such as outsourcing of non-core 
activities, particularly in light of increasing complexities and the 
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1. Introduction 
Internationally, development banks emerged as governments of many 
countries attempted to accelerate economic development by directing 
finance to achieve this objective. Accordingly, it was felt that 
development banks had a major role to play in steering resources 
appropriately, particularly where there is market failure.  Thus, 
development banks were deemed as a critical ingredient to improving 
access to credit, allowing for the provisioning of long-term finance at a 
low price, and the financing of start-up activities.  In addition, 
development banks were seen as essential to the financing of employment 
creating activities such as the development of the agricultural sector.1
Seibel (2000) examined the performances of agriculture 
development banks worldwide and found that they have suffered from 
political interference, have been largely unsupervised and therefore not 
subject to prudential regulations and strict monitoring. The author 
argued that in the majority of cases, these institutions became 
unsustainable, technically bankrupt, lacking the ability to diversify and 
attract customers and funding. The author further contended that 
successful reforms have encompassed operational autonomy, and have 
put in place legal provisions for prudential norms, focussing on 
financial viability. Seibel (2000) suggested that any successful reform 
on development banking needed to be done in a context of favourable 
demand conditions, and commitments to profitability and sustainability 
of operations. 
                                                     
1  See Sunita Pitamber (2003) for example. 
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The study proposes to follow on from Seibel (2000) through the conduct of a case study.  
Accordingly, the primary focus of the study would be on the specialist development bank, 
Agriculture Development Bank (ADB).  An examination of this bank is useful as the bank remained 
largely government owned (97%) and survived for nearly 40 years, with its financial position 
turning around from extreme losses to reflecting profitability.  However, at times its operations 
would be compared with the Development Finance Limited (DFL), formally Development Finance 
Corporation, so as to make inferences on the relative performance of ADB. 
The next section examines the evolution and performance of development banking in 
Trinidad and Tobago, focussing in particular on ADB. It gives a brief sketch of the stylised facts, 
the broad financial system, the operational structure, the relevance of ADB, the scale of operations, 
the market penetration, the rebound of ADB and its relative performance to DFL. The study then 
goes on to explore the strategic focus of ADB in a bid to gain lessons on the way forward.  
Accordingly, the short and long-term focus of the institution are discussed, after which the 
institutional framework is highlighted and the governance and administrative scheme of the bank 
are closely examined.  The issues regarding ADBs’ ability to collect funds, and its autonomy are 
also explored. Following this, in the discussion preceding the conclusion, suggestions regarding the 
strengthening of financial intermediation by the bank and ways by which the specialist development 
banks can increase there viability are put forward. 
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2. Evolution and evaluation of 
development banking 
2.1(a) Stylised facts on development banking 
in Trinidad and Tobago 
Around the time of independence, the government of Trinidad and 
Tobago (GOTT) attempted to achieve targeted credit allocation through 
the creation of specialist lenders to industry and agriculture.  Accordingly, 
four specialist institutions, the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), 
the Trinidad and Tobago Mortgage Finance Company, the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and the Development Finance 
Corporation (DFC) emerged between the years 1959 and 1970. This in 
itself was an innovation to the financial structure in Trinidad and Tobago, 
as it broadened the financial landscape, since at the time of independence 
in 1962 capital markets were rudimentary and there was a limited range of 
finance companies and specialised financial institutions. It also 
represented Government’s attempt to intervene directly in the Credit 
Market in a bid to steer credit to desired sectors, given the perception that 
commercial banks would not be motivated to lend to certain sectors where 
the expected financial rate of return was low. 
9 
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By the 1980s, it was evident that most of these institutions were not self-sustaining and were 
in fact a drain on the treasury, given the severity of accumulated losses they suffered.2  Bourne 
(1989) attributed the failure of these institutions to many shortcomings including (1) the fact that 
they were afflicted with high rates of loan delinquency and (2), their asset base was small and they 
were therefore unable to finance important market segments given their high dependence on 
funding from fiscal allocations. 
Partly as a result of this, by the 1980s government retreated from the idea of development 
banks. Government was also motivated by the financial liberation arguments that were taking root 
worldwide. Consequently, the IDC was closed in 1988, the DFC began a process of divestment in 
1984 to eventually become Development Finance Limited and the future of ADB was uncertain 
during the latter part of the 1980s as government had withdrawn its funding from the institution in 
1985, forcing the bank to rely on funds from the Caribbean Development Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank. 
At present, the number of recognised development banks in the database of the Central Bank 
of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT) has been reduced to two, TTMF and ADB. The TTMF begun as 
the Trinidad Mortgage Agency in 1961 before it became the TTMF in 1965.  Government was then 
a minority shareholder with 20 per cent share ownership.  At present, government owns 49 per cent 
and the National Insurance Board owns 51 per cent of the company. The company holds a portfolio 
of loans in real estate, home ownership and construction, which have proven to be quite profitable 
for the company. For the sake of this study, direct comparisons between ADB and TTMF are not 
really feasible, since TTMF deals mainly in long-term instruments much beyond that of ADB, and 
they operate in totally different markets. 
Useful comparisons can be drawn with DFL, however, as the companies are close in the 
terms of the type of customers they seek, that is, customers interested in entrepreneurship. DFL 
begun operations in 1970 with 95 per cent of its initial equity been provided by government. 
However, it was the intention of government to have the company operate as a privately controlled 
entity so that eventually the company was divested to become private sector controlled and the 
focus broadened to include international lending, investment in risk capital operations, foreign 
currency lending, export oriented manufacturing, industrial services and tourism. The major 
shareholders in DFL in 2002 were RBTT (29.7%), GOTT (28.1%), European Investment Bank 
(8.5%) and Inter-American Investment Corporation (8.5%). While profits are an essential objective 
of DFL, the company focuses on the disbursement of funds to emerging areas in the economy. 
The role ascribed to ADB was to finance the sustained development of the agribusiness 
sector.  The bank fell under the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources.  It consisted 
of four main branches and four sub offices, the difference been that the sub offices opened only on 
Wednesdays while the main branches opened at least five days per week. The bank boasts of 
already providing just under US$500 million, or over 40 thousand loans since inception, to the 
agricultural sector. These loans have been targeted to primary production in livestock, agro 
processing, farm mechanisation and marine fishing. In addition, the bank has financed the broiler 
industry, commercial horticulture and has supported the construction of multipurpose fishing 
vessels. The scope and penetration ADB is, however, impacted on by the depth of the financial 
sector which is revealed through an examination of the broad financial system. 
                                                     
2  See Bourne (1989). 
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2.1(b) The broad financial system 
The financial sector in Trinidad and Tobago has become more sophisticated since independence, 
particularly with the emergence of capital markets, new types of financial intermediaries and new 
types of financial instruments. For example, the government pioneered the graduation from the 
informally organised call exchange to a stock market in 1981, thus formalising the formation of the 
equities market.  Accompanying the creation of the stock exchange was the incorporation of the 
Trinidad and Tobago Unit Trust in that same year, kick-starting the mutual funds industry.  
Moreover the non-bank financial sector expanded with the formation of mortgage and finance 
companies. 
Table 1 
COMPOSITION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
(Percentage) 
Institutions Percentage of 
assets in 1988 
Percentage of 
assets in 2005 
Central Bank 20.3 19.7 
Commercial Banks 43.0 32.5 
Finance Companies and Merchant Banks 3.0 7.8 
Trust and Mortgage Finance Companies 8.6 5.6 
Thrift Institutions 0.4 0.0 
Development Finance Institutions 4.0 1.2 
Unit Trust Corporation 0.3 9.3 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 0.1 0.5 
Home Mortgage Bank 0.6 1.1 
Life Insurance Companies 11.5 14.9 
National Insurance Board 8.2 7.3 
Source: Tabulated from the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago: Annual Economic Survey,  
1988 and 2005. 
 
By 2005 commercial banks only accounted for just under 33 per cent of the assets in the 
financial sector, see Table 1. This is in contrast to 1988 when commercial banks accounted for 43 
per cent of assets in the financial sector. At the same time the unit-trust corporation rose to 
significance as its share of assets in the financial sector rose from 0.3 per cent to 9.3 per cent in the 
seven year interval. The growth of development banks was not as spectacular as their share of the 
financial system slid from 4 per cent to 1.2 per cent. 
2.2 Source of funds to ADB 
Being a non-deposit taking institution, ADB has had to rely on external funding and returns from its 
operation, in order to fund its agricultural lending programme. Unlike other development banks in 
the Caribbean, ADB had not sourced funds from a plethora of international financial institutions.3 
Rather, since the 1990s the bank sourced funds for onlending from two development banks, from 
government and through direct financing from the market.4  
                                                     
3  Development banks in the region collectively accessed funds from the CDB, Multinational banks such as IDB, European 
Development Agencies and commercial banks in the region. 
4  In addition the bank did take a mortgage with a commercial bank in order to purchase its headquarters. 
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ADB loanable funds were raised through the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) and 
the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB and directly from the market through the issue of fixed rate 
zero coupon bonds, See Table 2. In December 1988, a loan contract was signed between the IADB 
and the GOTT, with the ADB acting as the executing agency.  The proceeds of this loan was to be 
realised through several draw-downs totalling US$ 26.9 million and to be repaid in a period of 23 
years.  By 1998, about 96 per cent of the loan was already drawn-down.  The ADB also accessed a 
loan of US$ 10 million from the CDB with the first instalment paid in 1993.  By 2004 the Bank had 
already repaid close to 80 per cent of the principal.  The GOTT also raised over 20.2 million in 
loans from the IADB.  The proceeds of the loan in turn was passed on to ADB through the purchase 
by the government of 8 per cent non-cumulative redeemable preference shares from the Bank in 
1997. A portion of the loan was disbursed under the Bank’s Global Agricultural Credit Programme. 
Table 2 
ADB LIABILITY PROFILE: PERCENTAGE OF CREDIT TO TOTAL LIABILITIES 
(Percentage) 
 1994 1995 2000 2001 2003 2004 
IADB Loans 56.3 58.6 0 0 0 0 
CDB Loans 27.9 22.7 18.1 16.2 2.8 2.0 
First Citizens Loans 0.8 0.6 0 0 0 0 
Redeemable Preference 
Shares 
0 0 78.3 82.2 21.4 20.3 
Fixed Rate Coupon Bond 0 0 0 0 74.7 76.5 
Total Loans 82.7 79.9 18.1 16.2 77.5 78.5 
Source: Calculated from ADB Annual Reports 
 
Table 3 
DFL PERCENTAGE OF CREDIT TO TOTAL LIABILITIES 
(Percentage) 
 2003 2004 
Short-term Credit  3.9 5.8 
Long-term Credit 80.7 78.4 
Conditional Credit and Private Equity Funding  10.8 11.6 
Total Credit 95.4 95.8 
Source: Calculated from DFL Annual Reports. 
 
An examination of Table 2 suggests that ADB liability profile changed from a concentration 
of credit from level one development banks, to bonds raised on the open market. The liability 
structure in 1994 and 1995 were over 80 per cent in favour of loans from the IADB and CDB, 
whereas, loans from these institutions declined fundamentally in 2003 to 2004, as the bank issued 
fixed rate coupon bonds which now accounted for about 75 per cent of its liabilities. The switch in 
portfolio was assisted by high liquidity in the Trinidad and Tobago economy and the resultant boom 
conditions.  DFL, shared a similar liability structure in 2003-4 with 78 per cent of its liabilities been 
in terms of long-term credit, of which over 64 per cent were raised through floating rate bonds, 
some of which were due to mature by 2030, see Table 3. DFL also supplemented its credit by 
borrowing from the European Investment Bank (EIB) to fund its private equity products. 
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2.3 Importance of ADB as a credit provider 
Prior to 2003, lending to the agriculture sector was dominated by commercial banks, see Table 4. It 
took a special event, the closing of the largest plantation in the country, to create conditions for 
ADB to overtake commercial banks in lending to the sector.  This allowed ADB to make the leap to 
become the most significant lender to the agricultural sector by 2003.  
Table 4 
MARKET SHARE IN THE AGRICULTURE CREDIT MARKET 
(Percentage) 
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ADB Loans to Total 
Agricultural Loans  
32.9 42.0 26.7 16.9 72.3 77.4 
Commercial Bank Loans to 
total loans to agriculture 
60.4 51.8 66.6 80.4 26.8 21.3 
Source: Agricultural Development Bank: Annual Reports various years, Central Bank of Trinidad and 
Tobago: Annual Economic Survey, various years. 
 
Commercial banks tended to fund the upstream segments pertaining to agriculture, rather 
than agriculture production. Thus, even though commercial banks dominated loans to the sector in 
the past, ADB played a greater role in funding production in primary agriculture. Most of the 
funding provided by the bank in 2004 (88%), went into sugarcane production in south and central 
Trinidad. 
From Table 5, it is evident that commercial banks allocated a minimal percentage of their 
portfolio to the agriculture sector, no doubt in order to minimise their risk exposure to the sector. 
Moreover, in 2005, lending to agriculture declined in importance in the portfolio of commercial 
banks compared to the previous decade, while it rebounded in the ADB to account for 50 per cent 
of assets. 
Table 5 
IMPORTANCE OF LOANS TO AGRICULTURE IN THE ASSET PORTFOLIO OF INSTITUTIONS 
 1994 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ADB 54.1 48.0 46.3 33.2 27.4 58.5 58.3 
Commercial Banks 2.6 2.8 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.5 
Source: Agricultural Development Bank: Annual Reports various years, Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago: Annual 
Economic Survey, various years. 
2.4 Scale of operations 
2.4(a) Target market 
It is useful to examine the relative growth of sectors in order to have an idea of the demand 
conditions that the development banks faced. These target markets take their tone from economic 
cycles, and in turn, the financing and viability of development banks are impacted on by these 
cycles among other factors.  For example, the demand for financial products and the ability of 
borrowers to repay depends on the success of businesses in the market place. Thus continuous 
growth of sectors suggests a favourable economic climate that promotes viable prospects for 
financial intermediation. 
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The economic cycles in the Trinidad and Tobago economy were largely driven by the 
performance of the energy sector.  In the thirty years leading up to 2004, four periods may be 
identified: (1) an oil boom which occurred between 1974 and 1981; an economic recession which 
occurred between 1982 and 1989; a transition period which occurred between 1990 and 1993; and 
another economic boom which occurred from 1994 onwards.  Table 6 captures the relative growth 
performance of selected sectors during the different economic cycles. 
Table 6 
PERCENTAGE GROWTH OF SECTORS AT THE END POINT OF ECONOMIC CYCLES 
OF THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ECONOMY 
(Percentage) 
 Growth by 1981 
over 1974 
Growth by 1989 
over 1982 
Growth by 1993 
over 1990 
Growth by 2004 
over 1994 
Agriculture 126.9 -3.5 11.1 8.7 
Manufacturing 202.8 75.0 19.3 143.6 
Construction 837.3 -46.1 9.4 207.2 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 
388.0 -16.4 30.2 122.7 
Distribution 275.1 17.73 34.6 185.7 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 609.6 -4.3 38.8 184.2 
Other Services 277.5 -4.5 18.4 151.4 
Source: Data are obtained from the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago data base. 
Notes: Cycles are taken as 1974-1981; 1982-1989; 1990-1993; and 1994-2004. 
 
Agriculture, the target market for ADB, exhibited a lethargic performance after 1981, with its 
growth declining during the economic recession and subsequently only showing moderate growth 
in nominal terms.  In fact growth of the other sectors outpaced agriculture, so that the sector 
declined from 5 per cent of GDP to 1 per cent of GDP during the 30 year interval leading up to 
2004, see Table 7.5
Table 7 
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION OF SECTOR TO GDP AT FACTOR COST (CURRENT PRICES) 
(Percentage) 
Sector 1952 1975 1985 1995 2004 
Agriculture 18 4.6 2.4 2.3 1.0 
Manufacturing 14 6.7 7.3 8.2 6.7 
Construction 3 6.2 11.2 7.8 8.1 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication  
 8 8.9 9.3 7.8 
Distribution 10 12.4 12.2 14.0 13.8 
Financial Services 2 6.2 12.1 12.3 12.7 
Other Services  5.4 7.5 5.6 4.5 
Source: 1952 and 1985 were extracted from the Trinidad and Tobago Central Statistical Office: National Income of 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1966-1982 and 1981-1990. the rest were obtained from the Central Bank of  the Trinidad and 
Tobago Central Bank database in 2005. 
 
In physical terms, the number of farmers declined by 37.4 per cent between 1982 and 2004 
(See the Agriculture Census Survey).  The performance of the sector was negatively impacted on by 
declining output levels, declining productivity, high implementation costs of government programs, 
                                                     
5  The importance of the agriculture sector in 2004 can be contrasted with 1952 when the sector accounted for as high as 18 per cent of 
GDP, the leading contributor to GDP in that year. 
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rising wages, declines in transfers to the sector, lack of adequate infrastructure and improper land 
use practices.6  
2.4(b) Asset size 
Both institutions reflected steady and similar growth rates leading up to 1980, see Figure 1.  
Following a decline in the economy in 1982, the steady growth in the assets of the institutions was 
interrupted.  DFL recorded a continuous decline up to 1988 after which asset growth was largely 
positive. The assets of ADB fluctuated between US$31 million and US$45 million for 20 years 
preceding 2003. DFL showed faster recovery from the economic downturn as its growth picked up 
by 1988 and it remained positive ever since. It is instructive to note that DFL under private sector 
control went through the process of aggressively reinventing itself during the recession while ADB 
was slow in doing so. DFL adapted to the changing economic circumstances of the economy, 
offering more products and modified their method of disbursement of funds. 
Figure 1 



























Source: The graph is drawn on the basis of data extracted from the annual reports of 
ADB and DFL for various years. 
Notes: The exchange rate used to convert to US$ was TT$6.29=US$1.00.  This was 
used for the entire series in order to preserve the trend without introducing volatility 
arising from exchange rate movements. 
 
The stagnation of ADB during the recession also point to the difficulties that are associated 
with a specialised bank when there is an economic downturn and the targeted sector declines.  
While DFL was able to jump to sectors that were relatively growing during the recession, ADB was 
not allowed to. This point presents a policy dilemma.  How can a specialist bank adapt when its 
target market is declining? 
                                                     
6  See Bourne 1992. 
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2.5 Market penetration 
Private or public sector ownership did not matter, as both entities remained liquid. ADB penetrated 
about 30 per cent of the market, in spite of the fact that the bank had excess lending capacity.7 As a 
result the bank had a surplus of idle funds available for investments. Total liquid assets were over 
35 per cent between 2001 and 2004 (See Table 8).  In some cases the excess liquidity was due to the 
fact that funds were raised for specific loan programs and the program was underutilised by 
farmers. Instead, ADB invested the idle funds in mutual funds. The excess lending capacity was 
also a feature of Development Finance Limited as its liquidity was also over 35 per cent. Evidently 
effective demand for loans did not extend these institutions to their limit. 
Table 8 
PERCENTAGE OF LIQUID ASSETS TO TOTAL ASSETS 
 1994 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ADB Total Liquid Assets 6.1 13.3 27.8 43.6 51.5 35.8 36.6 
ADB Total Investments 3.6 6.6 25.9 41.1 50.3 35.4 36.4 
DFL Total Liquid Assets      37.7 41.2 
Notes: Calculated from ADB and DFL Annual Reports. 
 
In the face of a declining target market and high loan delinquencies, the government 
announced in 2001 that it will terminate the lending activities of ADB.  Instead, a new organisation 
was to be incorporated, the Agriculture Development Corporation that would combine and exercise 
the business activities of both ADB and the National Agriculture Marketing and Development 
Corporation (NAMDEVCO).8 This plan did not materialise, so that ADB continued in operation, 
but under the threat of closure. 
2.6 The rebounding of ADB 
Significant changes emerged in the organisation and management of the bank from 2001. There 
were changes in the Board of directors and in the executive management of the Bank by 2002.  The 
new board was given the mandate to review and make recommendations on the report of the 
technical committee on the viable options for ADB. The board subsequently submitted its report to 
government. 
The board explored other business options for ADB.  One such option successfully led to a 
radical growth in loans of the bank in 2003.  The bank sourced financing and engineered a new 
product to outgoing workers of CARONI 1975 limited. The closure of the CARONI Estate by 
government provided an opportunity for the Bank to engineer new loans and therefore write new 
business. The Bank formed a strategic alliance with the Unit Trust Corporation of Trinidad and 
Tobago (UTT), in order to develop a loan product where the Voluntary Separation Package granted 
to workers, was deposited in the UTT and used as collateral for a loan from the ADB to invest in 
agriculture.  ADB was to receive returns on the loan through the capital gain on the growth of the 
collateral in the mutual funds scheme. The bank was able to attract 60 per cent of the recipients of 
VSEP in the loan program called the “CARONI VSEP Sweetner”. 
                                                     
7  According to the Agriculture Census Survey in 2003, the market consisted of 19,143 enumerated farmers. 
8  NAMDEVCO was incorporated in 1991 and given the mandate to identify markets; conduct marketing research; maintain 
information on commodity prices; oversee agro-industrial investments; link buyers and sellers; manage wholesale markets and export 
infrastructure and conduct training. 
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2.7 The performance of ADB 
2.7(a) Income 
Not unlike most other agriculture development banks in the world, the profitability of ADB in 
Trinidad and Tobago, was not encouraging in years prior to 1998, see Figure 2. During these earlier 
years, ADB made losses with near consistency, with losses reaching as much as 8.4 per cent of 
assets in 1996. Profits were only recorded in 1983 and 1984. As a result of the losses suffered by 
the bank, its accumulated losses by 1998 climbed to 115 per cent of assets. 
Figure 2 
ADB INCOME AND ACCUMULATED INCOME/LOSSES AS A 
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Source: Graph constructed from ADB Annual Report 
 
ADB realised a recovery in its profitability from in 1998 when it made a profit of 
US$1.1million. Profits continued to expand, reaching US$3 million by 2004 and the bank made an 
average return on assets of 2.5 per cent during the period. As a result of the increases in the profit 
level and an expansion in assets, the accumulated losses lessened in intensity to reach 22.5 per cent 
of total assets by 2004. 
DFL on the other hand, returned to profitability much earlier. Its losses were incurred from 
around the mid 1980s onto the end of that decade, see Figure 3.  With the restructuring of the 
company, DFL was able to realise a turnaround, so that the company once again earned profits from 
1990.   Annual return on assets averaged 1.7 per cent between 1990 and 2004. 
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Figure 3 





















Source: Constructed from data obtained from DFL annual reports, various issues 
 
Interest income accounted for a significant portion of returns of the development banks, with 
ADB relying more heavily on interest income compared to DFL, see Table 9.  Net interest income 
accounted for 93 per cent of total net income in 2004, with the rest of income been derived from 
loan processing fees, recovered bad debts, commissions, gain on the disposal of fixed assets and 
miscellaneous income. The rise in ADB interest income was due to the increase in the volume of 
loans in 2003, a point that emphasised the importance of the expansion in business for the viability 
of the institutions. 
In the case of DFL, its income profile was more diversified.  In 2004, for example, interest 
accounted for 43.5 per cent of its net income, followed by net income from investments which 
accounted for 28.7 per cent of its income.  The rest of income included unlisted investments such as 
equity investments as well as other income including currency movements and income from 
leasing.  
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Table 9 
INTEREST INCOME (%) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
ADB*** interest income on loans 











Interest Income on loans to total 
loans 
15.1 17.2 24.6 8.7 7.8 
Interest on Loans to Assets 7.0 5.7 6.8 5.1 4.5 
ADB 
Interest on other Investments to 
assets 
2.5 3.3 2.5 2.7 4.9 
Interest Income on loans to total 
loans 
10.9 11.3 9.0 8.9 8.3 
Interest on Loans to Assets 5 5.1 4.3 4 3.6 
DFL 
Interest on other Investments to 
assets 
5.1 5.0 3.2 2.8 3.0 
Source:  Calculated from ADB and DFL Annual Reports. 
Notes:  Percentage calculated as (ADB interest income minus DFL interest income)/DFL interest income. In dollar terms, 
DFL interest income was subtracted from ADB interest income. 
 
Variations in activities did not make a difference to the importance of interest rates on loans, 
however, as neither institution consistently dominated the other with respect to interest income on 
loans.  Thus ADB earned more interest income on loans between 2000 and 2003, but then DFL 
earned more in 2003 and 2004. 
It is important to note also, that investment of idle funds outside of lending, contributed to the 
earning capacity of the institution. In some instances, interest from investments exceeded interest 
from lending for both institutions. This occurred in the case of ADB in 2004 and for DFL in 2000.  
These investments were mainly placed in mutual funds, reflecting the increased sophistication of 
the financial sector. 
2.7(b) Efficiency 
The composition of operating activities was generally similar for both ADB and DFL, but there was 
a wedge in the magnitude of overhead cost between the two institutions for most of the period.9  
Notwithstanding the similarity in the structure of overhead costs, ADB consistently incurred higher 
operating costs during the 30 years leading up to 2004, see Figure 4.  For example, in 2004 ADB 
operating cost was 10 per cent over DFL in absolute terms. The higher operating cost of ADB was 
mainly due to the higher staff costs incurred by the bank. Figures for 2000-4 were unavailable, but 
in 1999 ADB staff cost was more than 86 per cent higher than that of DFL.  Between 1994 and 
1998 the magnitude of ADB staff cost ranged between 59 and 200 per cent over that of DFL, or in 
physical terms it was over US$600 thousand and US$1 million over that of DFL.  This reflected 
higher levels of technical staff employed by the bank to perform duties inclusive of credit 
evaluation, project evaluation and monitoring, and the staffing of four branches and sub-offices in 
order to reach clients at strategic locations. 
Partially as a result of larger operating costs, ADB exhibited higher levels of cost 
inefficiencies when efficiency is measured as the ratio of cost to assets.  The cost to asset ratio 
fluctuated within the 6 and 9 per cent band for most of the 30 year period, see Figure 4. At the same 
time, DFL cost to asset ratio fell below the lower limit of that band for most of the period, moving 
between 1 and three per cent in the latter half of the period.  Eventually, in 2003 ADB efficiency level 
                                                     
9  Generally, operating costs included fees for professional services such as auditors, consultants, directors, legal services and 
marketing.  In addition, expenses entailed infrastructure expenses, repairs and maintenance, utilities and security.   
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caught up with DFL.  This occurred because of the jump in loans generated by lending to former 
workers of CARONI 1975 Limited. 
Figure 4 
























Source: Annual Reports of DFL and ADB, various issues. 
The higher level of cost to asset ratio in part reflected higher expenditure by ADB on personnel 
emoluments. Another reason for ADB higher level of cost inefficiency for most of the period was its 
lower level of loans per unit of cost compared to DFL, see Table 10.  This reflected higher monitoring 
costs of customers as the bank is required to, among other things, check the suitability of land, make 
frequent site visits, and provide technical support. This can be illustrated by examining the level of 
lending generated per unit of cost.  Up until 2002, ADB generated a lower level of loans for a unit of 
cost.  DFL generated a larger volume of loans, perhaps assisted by the fact that it was financing a 
broader range of sectors.  
Table 10 
LOANS PER UNIT COST (FIGURES ARE IN $US) 
 2004 2003 2002 1990 1980 1974 
ADB 25.0 23.0 4.0 11.0 5.6 11.5 
DFL 17.9 18.5 22.3 30.6 16.0 13.0 
Source: Annual Reports of DFL and ADB, various issues. 
What emerges from the evidence, is that even though a specialist bank can be expected to better 
accumulate knowledge of its targeted sector and therefore achieve cost economies, in reality, personnel 
cost become over burdening unless the target market expands. In the case of ADB, the volume of 
business remained constrained by the decline in agriculture production.  The specialist bank still needed 
to be staffed in a certain way in order fulfil its mandate, so that it costed the bank more per unit of asset 
to operate.10  ADB was only able to climb out of this situation when there was a large expansion in its 
scale of lending. 
                                                     
10  These fixed overheads included the employment of specialist professionals in the agriculture sector and the staffing at various 
branches to reach farmers and monitor projects. DFL, on the other hand operated chiefly from its head office. 
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3. The strategic focus of ADB 
3.1 Short and long-term focus 
The bank undertook a strategic planning exercise for the period 2005 to 
2007.  In conducting a SWOT analysis, the bank noted that while it had 
developed knowledge of the sector over the period of its operation, it had 
imaging weaknesses, its systems were reactive and not proactive, and the 
cost of operations was high.  The bank also noted that the moral of the 
staff was low and it was unable to satisfy the needs of farmers.  ADB 
therefore sought to find ways by which it can address these issues so as to 
enhance its ability to meet the strategic targets of the government. 
In its strategic plan, ADB established its goals in terms of the 
need to engage in “strategic management development; strategic 
alliance development and management; re-branding, re-imaging and 
repositioning; financial growth; sector growth; and corporate cultural 
realignment.”  Out of these, the bank identified the first two as needing 
immediate attention so as to lay the platform for the other policy goals. 
The strategic plan outlined a number of short-term objectives 
through which these policy imperatives were to be achieved.  For 
example, the bank articulated that financial growth can be achieved 
through increased profitability and through increased lending. Also, re-
branding, re-imaging and repositioning were expected to be achieved 
through the encouragement of internal stakeholder and external 
stakeholder feedback, as well as through customer retention, see  
Appendix 1.   Stakeholders  included  staff,  clients  and  potential 
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ones, and coordinating agencies, all of which the bank had collectively identified as internal and 
external stakeholders.  In effect, the bank had taken a marketing view of its services recognising 
that the successful implementation of its plans revolved around its ability to achieve coordination 
with the stakeholders. 
A limitation of the strategic plan is that it required an expansion in the agriculture sector to 
fuel demand, but the factors influencing the expansion were to a large extent outside the control of 
the bank.  One of these factors was the political will to invest resources to expand the sector. 
Previously, the existence of preferential agreements for agriculture exports to Europe provided a 
natural source of motivation for member governments of the African Caribbean Pacific Countries 
(ACP) to meet export quotas. Now that preferential treatment has unravelled, the principal 
motivation for government seemed to stem from the continuous increase in the prices of imported 
food, and widespread public unease about rising food prices. For example, the Minister of Finance 
in his 2006-2007 budget speech in outlining the government’s measures for agriculture in the fiscal 
year said: “The Government recognizes the pervasive impact of the increases in food prices on the 
cost of living and on the welfare of families who need to struggle to make ends meet.” 
The long-term focus of the bank was therefore handed down through government policies 
towards the agriculture sector.  In the 2006 budget, government policies included the diversification 
of the sector through the enabling of private sector participation in order to equip the sector to 
broadly tackle food inflation while at the same time providing higher levels of employment in the 
sector.  To assist the bank to move in this direction, government made a grant of just under US$5 
million for credit disbursements. Unless the necessary investments take place to revamp the 
agriculture sector, there is the danger that the grant and other funding gestures to ADB, would only 
increase the liquidity of the bank, rather than reach the intended recipients. There are attempts by 
the government to expand demand in the sector through the establishment of 8 private sector 
operated large scale farms (at least 100 acres each), leasing of plots to farmers for agriculture 
production and the development of associated infrastructural work to facilitate the farmers. 
The government had given priority to the production of certain food crops, which included 
sweet potato, cassava, yam, dasheen, tomato, ochro, cucumber, melongene, pumpkin, eddoes, 
cabbage, lettuce, green pigeon peas, carrots and string beans. To facilitate the production of these 
crops, farmers were to be awarded production contracts that would allow for a guarantee minimum 
price should prices fall below a certain level. The government proposed to give priority to youths 
graduating from agriculture training programs.  It was envisaged that these measures would serve to 
expand the size of ADB target market and therefore would potentially widen the customer base of 
the bank with regards to primary production and possibly agro-processing in the medium to long-
term.  Thus these developments provided the bank with a new focus. 
3.2 Institutional framework 
Development banks in Trinidad and Tobago were audited by the Auditor General office in the 
Ministry of Finance, as opposed to the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, as is the case with 
respect to licensed financial institutions. As such, ADB followed accounting standards prescribed 
by the central government for public companies.  Nevertheless, the strategic plan for 2005-7 
recognised the importance of developing and implementing appropriate organisational policies and 
procedures, and to improve the performance management system of the bank.  Thus, the bank 
placed emphasis on the need for updating the internal auditing and updating policies of the 
organisation.  Consistent with this, the bank hired a company to review its internal accounting 
system, in 2004. 
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3.3 Governance 
The Agriculture Development Act of 1968 was amended by Act Number 8 of 1995. The amended 
Act prescribed a seven member board of directors appointed by the Minister.   According to the 
Act, the members of the board were to be given renewable appointments for a term of three years.  
The Act granted certain powers to the board which included, the underwriting of loans for 
agriculture, commercial fishing and other related activities; powers to accept savings or time 
deposits from the public; powers to take any form of security it chooses; powers to undertake equity 
investments in companies; powers to engage in joint ventures with other companies; powers to raise 
money for the financing of its operations; powers to borrow money; powers to acquire, purchase, 
hold and enjoy personal and real property of every description; and powers to assist generally in the 
development of agriculture cooperative movements. In addition to this, the board was also 
empowered to set guidelines with respect to interest rate on loans. 
Interestingly, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) under the Act is an ex-officio member of 
the board and is not allowed to vote, but is required to attend Board meetings and is accountable to 
the Board. The Board decides on the appointment of the CEO and s/he oversees the day to day 
affairs of the bank and acts on behalf of the bank in matters that are not reserved by the Board.  
Directly under the CEO is the rest of the executive management team, consisting of the Chief 
Executive Officer, the Corporate Secretary, the Corporate Manager (Human Resources), the 
Corporate Manager (Credit) and the Corporate Manager (Finance and Information Technology). 
ADB had been functioning at less than full strength following the voluntary retirement 
package that was offered by the bank to trim staff in 1995.  For example, in 2003, the staff level 
stood at 95, leaving the bank short by 21 employees, even though the activities of the bank 
continued at the same scale.  The bank noted that posts in finance, marketing, research, information 
technology, public relations and communications remained vacant.  During the five year period 
1997 to 2002, the bank also noted that there was a turn over of 4 different Board of Directors, 6 
chief executive officers and staff was demoralised, partly as a result of their uncertainty over the 
future of the institution and the lack of stable leadership. The effects of this turbulent period led to 
shortcomings in terms of the monitoring of loans by the bank and the lengthening of processing 
times of loans. With some reorganisation, the bank eventually improved its efficiency levels. 
3.4 Administration schemes and credit allocation 
The Act allowed ADB to lend up to a maximum maturity of 30 years. However, most of ADB loans 
tended to cover a maturity period of up to 3 to 5 years.  At the same time the bank also issued short-
term loans, similar to overdrafts, to finance the working capital of clients.  The bank made major 
strides with respect to the speed with which it can process loans and grant approvals.  For some type 
of loans, the bank was now capable of granting approval within the same day the application is 
made.  
ADB had not taken up its powers to accept savings deposits as the bank feared that this 
would carry them over into been a full fledged financial institution requiring the supervision and 
regulation of the central bank and strict enforcement of prudential standards. This would have also 
required the bank to hold a license to operate as a financial institution. The bank did not think it was 
ready to cross over to that stage, particularly as it was focussed primarily on expanding its outreach 
to farmers to raise the output of the agriculture sector. 
ADB targeted its lending along the lines of government policies for the development of the 
agricultural sector.  The bank worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine 
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Resources (MALMR) to coordinate its lending programmes, limiting its activities to the disbursement 
of loans. There was some level of diversification within the agriculture sector, as the bank lent to food, 
crops, livestock, fish, forestry and floriculture.  However, based on the pattern of demand there was 
still concentrations within these segments. 
Three quarters of the loan portfolio of borrowers were allocated to farmers in food crop 
production, with farmers in sugarcane accounting for the major share of these loans (69%), see Table 
11. With sugarcane been a traditional crop that served the export market to Europe, this suggested that 
the bank portfolio was concentrated in favour of the traditional staple that was dedicated to meeting 
the export quota of the ACP countries exporting under the LOME IV Agreement. The next largest 
group of borrowers were in livestock production, accounting for about 10% of borrowers, some 
distance below sugarcane production demand. In this category, farmers in poultry and diary production 
accounted for a little over three quarters of the subgroup.  Loans in favour of fishering formed the next 
category as they accounted for about 7 per cent of total borrowers in that subgroup. 
Table 11 
LOAN PROFILE OF ADB 
 Loan Profile Database Loan Profile for 2004 
 % of subgroup of 
borrowers to total 
borrowers in database 
% of borrowers in 
subgroup in ADB Data 
base 
% of loans in 
subgroup 
% of loans in 
subgroup 
Food Crops 75.7  57.3  
Sugarcane  68.7  87.6 
Cocoa/Coffee  4.3  3.3 
Vegetables  13.7  3.8 
Roots & Starches  2.3  2.6 
Fruits  3.8  2.7 
Pulses & Nuts  0.1   
Herbs & Spices  0.1   
Other Crops  0.1   
Cereals   6.8   
Livestock 9.7  37.4  
Diary  47.7  18.1 
Pigs  5.5  0.2 
Poultry  38.8  67.9 
Beef  0.8   
Small Ruminants  7.2   
Fish 6.5  5.3  
Marine Fish  94.3  100 
Aquaculture  1.3   
Ornamental  4.4   
Apiculture 0.4    
Forestry 0.5    
Floriculture 0.5    
Agro Industry & Tourism 3.3    
Agricultural Services 3.4    
Landscaping  38.1   
Mechanical Services  44.0   
Plant Propogation  17.9   
Source: Calculated from ADB Marketing Plan 2005-7. 
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ADB has been making efforts to penetrate non-traditional markets as the government sought 
to achieve a more diversified agricultural sector. Consequently, there were concerted efforts to tap 
into floriculture, agro industry and tourism and agricultural services. Moreover, government sought 
to create incentives for former workers involved in traditional sugarcane production and trainee 
graduates, to lure them into diverse areas of agriculture production. 
At the same time, ADB attempted to gain deeper market penetration through marketing effort 
and product innovation. Its marketing effort involved the staging of special events such as 
exhibitions, launching of new products and improving the timely delivery of services to meet 
customer satisfaction. The bank hoped that the branches strategically located throughout the country 
would assist in giving it nearness to the customer and therefore improve market penetration. In the 
case of product innovation, the bank has been directing its innovations at targeted market segments. 
The bank also targeted youth graduates from youth programmes in conjunction with the 
programmes of strategic partners such as MALMR, NAMDEVCO/ECIAF and so on. 
3.5 Capability of collecting funds 
In the past, the procedures with regard to the recovery of troubled loans were not well documented, 
so that collection procedures largely existed on the basis of institutional memory.  ADB sought to 
correct this shortcoming by documenting its procedures. This included the classification and 
recovery of impaired loans. According to the collection procedure, the recovery department can 
begin to take action to recover loans when it is 90 days overdue.  After the loan is 180 days 
overdue, interest is no longer added on, and the loan is considered impaired.   
The Bank does not have the authority to write off loans, however, since this must be decided 
on by Cabinet.  As a result, the loans must continue on the books of the bank. The result of this is 
that non-performing loans can assist in retarding the performance of the bank, even when there is no 
hope of recovery. According to the 2005-7 strategic report, this, along with increased operating 
costs, helped to undermine the profits of the bank. ADB got some relief when impaired loans that 
were not the subject of court action were sold to the state enterprise, Taurus, in 1995 at a third of 
their value. The loan portfolio consequently looked healthier, so that by 1999, for example, non 
performing loans accounted for 16.6 per cent of total loans.11
In principle, the bank has the freedom to monetise all forms of collateral. However, 
collections can be frustrated through informal connections by the borrowers with Government 
Ministers. This does open up the door for the timeliness of recoveries to be frustrated by political 
intervention. Government intervention has declined, however, as the government has a great desire 
to see the sector grow. 
3.6 Autonomy in loan award decision-making 
Like commercial banks, ADB has an approval process based on the size of the loan.  Branch 
Managers can approve loans between US$7,949 and US$15,898, while the CEO can grant approval 
up to US$39,746.  Beyond this level, the Board of Directors must approve the loan.  There was an 
instance of political intervention into the loan approval process when the previous government 
required the bank to seek its approval for the granting of new loans where a customer would be 
indebted to the bank at US$79,491 or above. This practice is no longer continued so that the board 
exercises final authority over the loan approval process. 
                                                     
11  See the 2001-5 Strategic Plan. 
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The bank also exercised full autonomy over the development and launch of new financial 
products. The ADB Act allowed the bank to provide financial products at its discretion. The Board 
had never exercised all its powers, however.  For example, the bank had never offered fixed 
deposits because of the fear that this would now mean that the bank is fully a financial institution 
and it may now need to be licensed and fall under the supervision of the Central Bank of Trinidad 
and Tobago whose prudential standards the bank must now meet, something the Board felt the Bank 
was not yet ready for. Nevertheless, the bank continued to introduce new financial products in terms 
of loans. 
The revisions to the ADB Act in 1995 allowed the Board to exercise full autonomy over the 
interest rate it can set on loans to customers.  The Board elected to maintain a prime rate of 6 per 
cent.  After borrower risk is added on, the rate can go up to 10 or 11 percent.  However, repayment 
is on an amortised basis, so that the effective rate turns out to be 4.3 per cent, substantially below 
market rates.12 The sustainability of this rate is questionable, however, as the expenses of the bank 
are increasing, it incurs risks, and it is unable to pass this on to the customers. 
A limitation of the autonomy of ADB, as in other state enterprises, is that the Board of 
Directors are not truly free from political interference, and the viability of the bank can be sacrificed 
for political expediency, or the goals of the directors may be diverted from looking after the 
viability of the institution in favour of their political interests.  Another limitation to the autonomy 
of the institution is that it cannot go outside of the agriculture sector to lend, even when demand in 
the sector dampens.  Thus where the sector is not expanding the bank is unable to avoid systematic 
risks since it is constrained by legislation to do so. 
 
                                                     
12  For example, the prime lending rate of commercial banks for October 23, 2006 was 11.75 per cent.  See the Central Bank of Trinidad 
and Tobago web site (http://www.central-bank.org.tt). 
26 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 192  The dynamics of specialist development banking: the case of... 
4. Strengthening financial 
intermediation 
4.1 Wholesale lending 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the predecessor to ADB, the Agriculture 
Credit Bank, lent mainly to agriculture corporative societies. Since then, 
the number of corporative societies has reduced substantially.  ADB tried 
to continue lending to corporative societies, but the results were not very 
encouraging. These cooperatives were granted an 18 month instrument of 
credit in writing, and they in turn issued the same instrument to onlend to 
their membership.  Unfortunately, where the loan was non-performing, 
collections became very difficult. The bank therefore exercised greater 
preference for the retailing of funds. 
4.2 The process of financial deepening 
ADB strategic report for 2005-7 has emphasized the importance of 
strategic alliances in the quest to effectively launch new products and 
therefore deepen and penetrate the market.  These strategic alliances can 
potentially allow the bank to leverage resources from other organisations, 
and therefore augment its manpower resources to implement its programs 
for the development of the sector in a cost effective manner. Accordingly, 
the bank has been making alliances with a number of supporting agencies, 
most of which stem from agricultural associations, government ministries 
and scientific groups.  These agencies include:  
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• MALMR for the National Credit Pilot Project;  
• The National Marketing and Development Corporation (NAMDEVCO), and the Business 
Development Company (BDC) for the Certified Farms Credit Pilot Project;  
• Caribbean Industrial Research Institute for product development and technical support;  
• The University of the West Indies for training and support, as well as the Anthurium 
Industry;  
• Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute for Training/Seminar;  
• Agriculture Society of Trinidad and Tobago for Promotions/Industry Commodities;  
• Youth Groups including Eastern Caribbean Institute of Agriculture and Forestry with 
respect to the youth agribusiness development fund;  
• Tobago House of Assembly/ADB for the Tobago Credit Pilot project; and 
• Hope Foundation with respect to the Microcredit Empowerment Fund. 
Alongside these strategic alliances, the bank also targeted the development of products as a 
deliberate strategy. The bank in its strategic report (2005-7) did set an annual target for launching 
three new products each year in the certified farm credit pilot project, youth agribusiness 
development fund and national credit pilot project.  In order to facilitate this, the bank had 
developed a “cross functional team to manage product development and marketing from ideas 
generation to commercialization”.13 Products were tailor-made for segments in rural communities 
and niche markets, as well as for high growth markets.  
Thus, the bank engaged in active product development through strategic alliances to ensure 
that the products are viable and suitable for farmers. Product development contained elements of 
credit differentiation. Differentiation included:  
• loan packages based on collateral.  Farmers with 100 per cent collateral are able to obtain 
instant loan package for 100 per cent of their funding;  
• targeted farm activities; and 
• tailor-making of arrangements according to contractual arrangements that farmers have in 
place for product distribution.  
4.3 Ways to improve profitability and efficiency 
ADB did not receive subsidies, and have been able to operate without taking new loans from 
international lenders and the CDB since 1998. The bank was able to hold its own as it consistently made 
profits since then.  Nevertheless, the operating cost of the bank is higher than that of its private sector 
counterpart, DFL. 
Regressions were conducted with regards to profitability and efficiency to examine how financial 
instruments and the asset outlay relative to sector demand impact on the viability of ADB, see Table 
12.14  The results suggest that asset expansion can play a vital role in improving the viability of the 
bank, by increasing cost efficiency and raising profitability.  As such, a unit increase in assets as a ratio 
of the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP (ASY) can reduce operating cost to assets (OCAS) 
by 0.4 times and raise the return on assets (ROA) by 0.5 times.  Put another way, the results suggest that 
the bank needs to write more business, given the sector demand, if it is to improve its viability. There is 
                                                     
13  See the Marketing Plan 2005-7. 
14  Full estimation details are available in Appendix II. 
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already some evidence of this, when there was a jump in assets in 2003 as new loans were written to the 
former workers of CARONI. This led to a drastic improvement in the efficiency ratio for the bank, so 
that the efficiency ratio narrowed to reach that of DFL.  It did indeed demonstrate the importance of 
economies of scale to the viability of the bank.  
Table 12 
PROFITABILITY AND EFFICIENCY REGRESSIONS 
 ROA OCAS 
C -0.11 0.07 
ASYt 0.47*** -0.36*** 
LASt 0.05 0.03** 
OCASt-1  0.03 
LIQAS 0.16***  
Adjusted R squared 0.04 0.20 
Notes:  The regression results are based on GMM estimation.  
*** is significant at a 1 per cent level; ** is significant at a 5 per cent 
level. 
 
The results also suggests that the investments made by the bank in liquid assets added 
significantly to the profitability of the bank, while the loans to assets ratio (LAS) did not add 
significantly to the returns on assets, but added significantly to the operating cost to assets of the bank. It 
is important to note that these investments do not form part of the core business of the bank, but in light 
of the results it can be tempting to reduce lending and favour liquid investments. Undoubtedly, 
however, the feasibility of investments would have been greatly assisted by the development and 
increasing financial sophistication of the financial sector and the emergence of new financial 
instruments, such as mutual funds that can offer higher net returns compared to when the bank begun in 
1968. Thus, idle funds of the bank have contributed significantly to the viability the bank. 
The results also show that the intensity of loans in the asset portfolio may significantly increase 
expenses.  The result suggests that an increase in the loans to asset ratio raises operating cost to assets by 
0.03 times. without the costs been properly passed on to the customers, because of the policy of the 
bank of maintaining low interest rates. The result is not surprising as it is typical for ADB to grant large 
numbers of micro loans to farmers, thus duplicating the costs of screening, monitoring and transactions 
costs by several times, compared to those institutions that lend a much larger volume of funds per 
customer. In the case of ADB, given the total customer base of 2,477 in 2004, the loans averaged 
US$27 thousand per customer. 
Given that the bank is constrained in raising interest rates to pass on costs, it  is in the interest of 
ADB to improve its viability by keeping costs down. This would suggest that the type of innovations to 
the disbursement of funds that may give higher monetary returns to the bank, are non-credit instruments, 
once the cost associated with risks do not exceed that of loans.  The bank has been reluctant with 
regards to equity participation, presumably because of the high risk involved in participating in the 
agriculture sector through equities.  There are other possibilities, however. For example, the bank can 
examine the possibility of disbursing funds through leasing.  This can perhaps be useful, where it assists 
farmers and fishermen to purchase equipment.  
An alternative is for the bank to find ways of lowering screening costs.  The collaboration 
between the bank and strategic partners can be productive in terms of assisting to lowering screening 
costs of clients and reduce the cost outlay with regards to monitoring. For example, the scientifically 
oriented strategic partners can incur the expenses of technical monitoring, while the bank concentrates 
on the financial aspect of the business. 
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4.4  Prudential measures 
The bank has recently begun to pay attention to risk management, with a risk manager been employed 
to perform risk analysis and to examine the quality of collateral. Operational risk continued to be 
examined by the branches and the recovery department. Exchange rate risk presented a real problem, as 
this risk was outside the control of the bank, and the effect of large depreciations in the rate on debt was 
itself not budgeted for.15  
The bank had also invested in the training of staff since 2000, in order to improve on credit 
appraisal, financial management and other aspects of business development.  This supported the 
CAMEL Standards that the bank had adopted to improve on its prudential measures.16 In addition, the 
bank invested in technology to improve its loan management system as well as assist in the management 
of other functions. 
There need, however, to be a more aggressive approach to risk management both at the 
technocratic level and with the strong support of the Board, if ADB is to get fully on top of its risk 
management. Clearly, risk pervades all aspects of the economic activities of ADB, but the strategic 
planning exercise did not seem to go far enough in addressing the issue of risk.  Where possible, risks 
should be quantified and there should be some level of risk sharing with clients through judicious 
pricing of products. Some of these risks include risks associated with credit,17 investments, liquidity18 
and these risks should be made part of the annual reporting exercise of the bank. A development bank 
cannot avoid risks, but the treatment of these risks is critical to the sustainability of activities.  
In contrast to ADB, DFL has been able to successfully integrate risk into its accounting and 
managerial frameworks.  A risk culture pervades the organisation at every strata including its corporate 
culture, accounting standards and staff recruitment. With the support of the Board of Directors and 
filtering down to the operational staff, the company seeks to identify the major risks faced by each 
segment of its operation, recruit staff that are suitable for risk mitigation, give assignments to staff with 
risk mitigation strategies in mind and continuously try to develop methods to grapple with risks. Indeed, 
DFL has put in place a risk management policy across all its operations, referred to as “Enterprise Risk 
Management System”. 
The impetus to DFL risk management was reinforced by the adoption of one of the latest 
accounting standards, the International Reporting Standards 7 (RFS 7). This standard has the advantage 
of integrating the critical elements of the company with regards to accounting, strategic planning and 
risk management, thus allowing the company to gain synergies. As a result the company was able to 
improve its information on risk management analysis and quantitative and qualitative risk disclosures to 
both its management and shareholders through its annual reports.  
DFL risk disclosures included information on risk concentration, the significance of financial 
instruments to the performance of the entity; the level of risk exposure arising from financial 
instruments including credit risks, liquidity risks and marketing risks; and a description of management 
policies with regards to risk, including objectives and processes for the management of risk. A better 
description of the risk measures are given in Chart 1 below. 
                                                     
15  To date, government had not compensated the bank, as promised, for previous depreciations in the exchange rate. 
16  The CAMEL standards are Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Efficiency, Earnings and Liquidity. 
17  Credit risks include risks associated with individual borrowers, borrower groups, geographic risks, risk associated with market 
segments, client product risks, ADB product risks and wider economic risks. 
18  The liquidity risks include the matching of the projected debt repayments of the bank with the projected income and other expenses 
of the bank, the ability of the bank to raise loans, and in the short-term issues related to the timing of cash flows. 
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Chart 1 
EXCERPTS OF IFRS 7 STANDARDS 
Qualitative Disclosure 
* Risk exposures for each type of financial instrument. 
* Management’s objectives, policies and processes for managing those risks. 
* Changes from the prior period. 
Quantitative Disclosures 
Provide information about the extent to which the entity is exposed to risk, based on information provided internally to the 
entity key management personnel. These disclosures include: 
* Summary quantitative data about exposure to each risk at the reporting date. 
* Disclosures about credit risk, liquidity risk, and market risk. 
* Concentration risk 
 
Given the limited range of economic sectors in the Caribbean markets, the major category of 
risk focussed on by DFL has been with respect to risk concentration, see Chart 2. In response to 
risks the company has (1) set limits on its exposure where there are exceptional credit risks; (2) 
increase its capital requirements to back the risks; (3) engage in risk sharing with other entities; and 
(4) embarked on geographical and product diversification. Moreover, DFL has sought to develop 
tools to improve risk mitigation, including the development of a credit scoring model and an 
internal risk rating model. 
Chart 2 
EXCERPTS FROM THE 2005 ANNUAL REPORT  OF DFL CARIBBEAN 
Credit Concentration of Risk 
* Identification of likely areas of concentration and assessment of the joint probabilities of default using suitable 
methodologies and data where available and appropriate judgement based on reasonableness in the light of experience. 
* The Board approves aggregate credit limits, in terms of capital and reserves based on objective criteria and analysis. 
* Establishment of  appropriate capital structures and risk-sharing arrangements to carry on lending and investment 
operations in national economies that have vulnerabilities of resource constraints. 
* A risk management framework identifies the types of risk and sets out internal procedures for the origination and 
management, … including the segregation of duties. 
Credit risk 
The probability that an enterprise might fail and not be able to meet its obligations because of poor management, poor 
judgement or inadequate execution plans.  The company has sited the importance of: 
* Reviewing systems and procedures 
* Periodically retraining senior staff. 
 
In addition to risks arising directly out of the operations of ADB there are also investment 
risks incurred by ADB. Investment risks arise especially as the institution seeks to deepen its 
incorporation into a more sophisticated financial sector. The bank has incurred greater investment 
exposure than before, particularly with respect to mutual funds. Risks associated with adverse 
movements in the market including movements in the stock markets now impact upon the bank, 
depending on their level of exposure. There needs to be deliberate measures by the bank to address 
this type of risk. 
Once the bank engages in investments in financial products, then its risk exposure on 
investments can become significant. The treatment of investment risk requires technical human 
resources to engage in portfolio management, to fully monitor markets and to shift around and 
diversify funds.  Accordingly the bank can find itself in need of specialist financial functionaries 
31 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 192  The dynamics of specialist development banking: the case of... 
and not only agriculture specialist, and the Board of Directors need to have a full appreciation of 
finance.  In the case of the latter, the ADB Act required that at least four members of the Board 
must have qualifications in agriculture, fisheries, finance, economics, accounting, industry, law or 
administration.  But the Act left the skill complement of the appointees to the discretion of the 
government. Given that the bank is a financial institution, there is a case for it to be mandatory 
that the qualification of a proportion of the appointees to be skilled in areas related to 
economics and finance. 
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5. The way forward 
5.1 ADB performance in brief 
Prior to 1998, ADB predominantly made losses which worsened during 
the economic recession between 1982 and 1989.  Moreover, the bank 
suffered adverse market demand in the recession which seemed to have 
triggered stagnation of its assets over a period of about 20 years. The bank 
also suffered as agriculture was given a low priority politically. During 
this period the low volume of business written by the bank as well as high 
rates of default led to severe accumulated losses and cost inefficiencies. 
The difficult period also uncovered weaknesses in the credit technology 
and management capacity of the bank. Weaknesses in the credit 
technology included poor documentation, poor attention to risk 
management, lack of attention paid to prudential measures, insufficient 
experience with regards to dealing with the market, and these problems 
were worsened by staff shortages and lack of autonomy in certain critical 
areas. The management problems occurred owing to limited knowledge at 
the time with regards to the management of a specialist development 
bank.  Nevertheless, the ADB had been the main supplier of credit to 
production agriculture and new entrepreneurs in the sector as commercial 
banks mainly lent to the upstream elements in the sector.  
ADB emerged as the leading credit supplier to agriculture by 
2003, as agriculture dwindled in the portfolio of commercial banks and 
lending by ADB to the agriculture sector picked up. The rebounding of 
the institution was ably assisted by the resurgence of the market as 
government had taken initiatives to develop and diversify the  sector.  
At  the  same  time  the  bank  had  benefited  from its past 
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experiences and had found better ways of managing its operations.  For example, the bank placed 
emphasis on strategic management, taking on board strategic partners, obtaining feed back from the 
market and product innovation. Moreover, it implemented risk management and prudential 
standards. 
In addition, the process of increased financial sophistication of the domestic market benefited 
the bank, so that it had been able to raise funds directly off the market. As a result, the bank did not 
borrow from tier 1 banks in the last decade, and in 2003 it raised financing through government 
guaranteed bond issues. 
Challenges to the smooth operations of development banks such as ADB remain, however. 
The bank still cannot write off loans either as this must be approved by cabinet.  The end result of 
this is that impaired loans from the past can undermine the profitability of the bank in the current 
period. Secondly, the nature of operations of the bank lends itself to high staff costs, but the bank 
has not passed this on to the customers since it was interested in maintaining low interest rates to 
encourage participation in the agricultural sector. Thirdly, the operations of the bank are not robust 
to economic cycles.  Downturns in the sector presents difficulties as the high cost of the requisite 
human resources remains, especially as the bank engages in holistic lending to the sector where 
feasibility, monitoring, and technical and financial advice complemented by financing activities are 
among the services undertaken by the bank. 
5.2 Lessons to be learnt 
There are some important lessons that can be gathered from ADBs experience that are instructive to 
a discussion on specialist development banking. One such lesson to be noted is that even if 
development banks may be necessary for the attainment of dedicated finance to a sector, it would 
not by itself lead to sustained sector expansion.  A supply leading relationship does not naturally 
occur, regardless of the incentive mechanisms offered by the bank to lure customers. Such an 
attempt must be followed up with continuous supporting activities both politically and 
institutionally.  On the political side, government must prioritise incentive mechanisms to expand 
and draw resources into the sector. It is through expansions of the targeted sector that demand 
expands and the development can grow and become viable.   
The institutional side is also very important.  ADB benefited immensely from the strategic 
partnerships it was able to cultivate. The partnerships acted as a support network, allowing the bank 
to leverage resources from other institutions for the mutual benefit of the bank and the strategic 
partners.  This benefited the bank in terms of been able to access resources at minimum cost and it 
potentially reduced screening costs in some cases. A lesson to be drawn here, is that there ought to 
be supporting mechanisms for the specialist bank, especially since it is lending to sectors where the 
risk of market failure is high. The experience of ADB suggests that supporting mechanisms through 
strategic alliances can be most useful in providing a critical support group to assist the bank to ride 
over its multiple challenges. 
Another lesson to be learnt, is with respect to the need to continuously strive for innovation 
in financial products for the disbursement of funds. This allows the financial institution to 
continually reinvent itself and in so doing, to potentially deepen its market penetration by been 
better able to meet the needs of clients. Along with this, is the continuous need for dialogue with the 
clients in the target market. 
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5.3 Some recommendations 
The findings emerging from the regression estimations suggest that ADB needs to actively work on finding 
non-loan methods of disbursing funds, while actively seeking to expand assets. In addition, there appears to 
be a minimal size of assets that must be reached, given the outlay of human resources the bank must incur, in 
order to effectively fulfil its mission to its clients. Accordingly the viability of the institution depended on the 
magnitude of business the bank was able to write in proportion to the scale of resource inputs the bank 
operated with, and as such economies of scale appeared to be extremely important to improving the 
efficiency of the bank. 
Development banks such as ADB need to make a concerted effort to improve their level of risk 
management, which includes quantifying risks where possible, in order to improve its long-term viability. 
This can be immensely assisted with the use of appropriate accounting standards as is the case with DFL, as 
well as the use of software tailor-made for the financial institution to improve its risk management and it can 
help to reduce the long-term cost of risk management. The focus on risks also requires a bit of a paradigm 
shift, since it can suggest that these financial institutions should at least share some of the risk with their 
clients, at least through risk pricing. Moreover, risk-based management improves the sustainability of the 
institution and the strategic management decisions over time. For example, due attention to investment risks 
and adjusted risk-based returns can be of immense value to guiding investment decisions of the financial 
institution.  
In addition, where advantageous, structures should be established to allow the bank to outsource some 
functions that take the bank away from its core business activities.19 This can include financial management 
services particularly with regards to risk management.  The advantage of this is that it allows the bank to 
concentrate on its core activities, and at the same time minimise its expenditure on the ancillary services, thus 
potentially improving cost efficiency. Areas that have the potential for outsourcing include risk management 
and investment portfolio management. The alternative of hiring financial managers, as part of the full time 
staff of the institution, can in fact be a more costly proposition. 
The bank should also actively attempt to cross-sell products to increase its revenue stream. Experience 
in the banking industry suggests that cross-selling is cost effective where products are complementary, where 
there is adequate customer demand and the development bank is able to beat the competition from regular 
financial intermediaries.20 Cross-selling can be useful in diversifying the income streams of the bank. 
Possibilities exist, such as the sale of crop insurance to farmers or acting as an intermediary for group 
insurance for fishermen. The success of cross-selling depends on the attitude of farmers, whether they would 
be willing to buy more than one product from the development bank and also on the level of usage by 
clients. Bundling products is also possible but price competitiveness of the bundled products is critical to the 
success of this idea, given the field of competitors in the financial sector. Another important possibility is the 
tying of lending and fixed deposits, so that the bank can combine the acceptance of deposits with loans and 
offer a package to clients at special rates. With the increased financial sophistication of the market, these 
deposits can be invested and provide a return to both the clients and the bank.  
As the financial sector becomes more complex and as the bank increases its exposure to investment 
risks through financial investments, the understanding of the risks and return becomes a priority.  The Board 
of Directors need to have a total appreciation of what is involved in making these investments.  Moreover, 
the development of new products involves an evaluation of the interplay between returns and risk. As such, 
the composition of the Board of Directors need to be carefully address, since the sustainability of the bank 
largely depends on the understanding of the board about financial matters. A portion of the Board should 
therefore have an adequate background in economics and finance in order to guide the financial decisions of 
the bank. 
                                                     
19  See Birchwood (2003) for a fuller discussion on cross-selling and tied products. 
20  Op. cit. 
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6. Conclusion 
It is evident from the study that development banks thrive best when the 
targeted sector is expanding and sector demand is increasing. As a result, the 
continued operation of a specialist development bank requires strong political 
and institutional support to the sector to accompany it, if it is to be successful.  
ADB also found that strategic alliances were helpful to improving its ability 
to penetrate the market and to develop customised products.  This suggests 
that a plethora of supporting agencies around the specialist bank can be 
critical to the sustainability of the development bank in the market, especially 
since the holistic wellbeing of the clients must be taken care of. There is 
evidence also that the marketing approach is essential for the success of 
development banks,  as in the case of ADB where the bank found it 
necessary to reinvent itself, continuously thriving for innovations and 
continuously consulting the market for feedback in order to develop products 
to satisfy customer needs. 
The study suggests that ADB can significantly improve its viability 
through non-lending methods of disbursing funds, since loans increased its 
expenses and did not contribute to its profitability given the maintenance of 
repressed interest rates. In addition, economies of scale mattered to the 
efficiency of the institution, suggesting that the bank needed to strive after 
asset expansion by writing more business. 
The study contends that risk management techniques, inclusive of the 
quantification of risks, are essential to improving the viability of development 
banks such as ADB.  Moreover, these banks need to embark on non-
traditional ideas such as outsourcing of non-core activities, particularly in 
light of increasing complexities and the demand for specialist skills 
associated with financial management. It is further suggested that they should 
seek to develop products for cross-selling to augment their revenue stream. 
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Imperatives identified by ADB Strategic Plan 2005-7 
(1) Strategic imperative 
Strategic Management Development. 
Key indicator 
Holistic View; Staff Motivation and Leadership philosophy. 
Indices 
• Timely Development Implementation of Strategic Plans – achievement of financial and 
economic indicator targets. 
• Development and implementation of optimal organizational structure – internal 
stakeholder feedback. 
• Development and implementation of staff development programmes. 
• Development and implementation of an effective Performance Management System – 
Internal Stakeholder feedback. 
• Development and implementation of appropriate organizational policies and procedures – 
internal stakeholder and external stakeholder feedback. 
• Implementation of appropriate technology – internal stakeholder and external stakeholder 
feedback. 
• Implementation of Leadership Philosophy – internal stakeholder feedback. 
 
(2) Strategic imperative 
Strategic Alliance Development. 
Key indicators 
Focus on advisory and facilitation roles in sector. 
 
Indices 
Advisory and facilitation role enhanced – external stakeholder feedback; achievement of 
financial and economic indicator targets. 
Product development – external stakeholder feedback; achievement of financial and 
economic indicator targets; 
Effectiveness of lobby – external stakeholder feedback achievement of financial and 
economic indicator targets; 
Level of market intelligence – external stakeholder feedback; achievement of financial and 
economic indicator targets. 
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(3) Strategic Imperative 
Sector growth. 
Key Indicators 
Growth & development of the sector. 
Indices 
• Reduction in food imports. 
• Increase in food exports. 
• Increased domestic food production. 
• Increased acreages/size of food productive units. 
• Increased sector employment. 
• Greater contribution to GDP. 
• Increase in the number of new entrants to sector. 
• Younger entrants to sector. 
• New activities in sector. 
• Enhancement of the standard of living. 
(4) Strategic Imperative 
Culture realignment. 
Key Indicators 
Quality & timeliness of delivery of services; technology; customer focus; competency and 
technical support. 
Indices 
Internal stakeholder and external stakeholder feedback. 
Customer retention. 
Level of productivity. 
Staffing retention. 
(5) Strategic Imperative 
Re-branding/reimaging/repositioning. 
Key Indicators 
Image; internal and external communication. 
44 
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 192  The dynamics of specialist development banking: the case of... 
Indices 
• Internal stakeholder and external stakeholder feedback. 







Increased lending levels. 
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Appendix II 
Regressions estimating profitability and efficiency of ADB using 
generalized method of moments 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Date: 10/26/06   Time: 11:54 
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2004 
Included observations: 30 after adjustments 
Kernel: Bartlett,  Bandwidth: Fixed (3),  No prewhitening 
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration 
Convergence achieved after: 4 weight matrices, 5 total coef iterations 
Instrument list: AGRISH(-1) LAS(-1) LIQAS(-1) AGRI 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
ASY 0.467360 0.140533 3.325627 0.0026 
LAS 0.047727 0.074977 0.636552 0.5300 
LIQAS 0.164337 0.079192 2.075163 0.0480 
C -0.106288 0.075585 -1.406199 0.1715 
R-squared 0.136194     Mean dependent var -0.014433 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036524     S.D. dependent var 0.033044 
S.E. of regression 0.032435     Sum squared resid 0.027353 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.682711     J-statistic 0.001684 
Notes: ROA is the return of assets of ADB; ASY is the ratio of Assets to GDP; LAS is the Ratio of 
Loans to Assets; LIQAS is the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets; C is the constant. 
 
Dependent Variable: OCAS 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Date: 10/25/06   Time: 23:28 
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2004 
Included observations: 30 after adjustments 
Kernel: Bartlett,  Bandwidth: Fixed (3),  No prewhitening 
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration 
Convergence achieved after: 26 weight matrices, 27 total coef Iterations 
Instrument list: AGRISH(-1) LAS(-1) LIQAS(-1) AGRI 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
ASY -0.362378 0.155919 -2.324142 0.0282 
LAS 0.033625 0.015847 2.121930 0.0435 
OCAS(-1) 0.032994 0.640519 0.051511 0.9593 
C 0.066966 0.049513 1.352488 0.1879 
R-squared 0.282208     Mean dependent var 0.069600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.199386     S.D. dependent var 0.019500 
S.E. of regression 0.017448     Sum squared resid 0.007915 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.042801     J-statistic 0.077180 
Notes: OCAS is the ratio of the Operating Cost to Assets. 
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